To Shareholders of Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Opportunity Fund ("PFO"):

Fiscal 2015 came to a close on November 30, and in most regards it was another respectable year for preferred stocks. Total return on net asset value ("NAV")[1] was 2.0% for the fourth fiscal quarter[2], and 4.4% for the full fiscal year. Total return on market price of Fund shares over the same periods were 6.8% and -0.1%, respectively.

The table below shows Fund returns over various measurement periods, and they continue to be very good. The table includes performance of two indices, Barclays U.S. Aggregate and S&P 500, as proxies for bond and stock markets, respectively. While neither is a benchmark for Fund performance, they provide context for returns on broad asset categories.

TOTAL RETURN ON NET ASSET VALUE
FOR PERIODS ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 2015
(Unaudited)

	Actual Returns			Average Annualized Returns			
	Three Months	Six Months	One Year	Three Years	Five Years	Ten Years	Life of Fund(1)
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Opportunity Fund	2.0%	1.3%	4.4%	8.8%	12.1%	8.2%	9.3%
Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index(2)	0.4%	-0.1%	1.0%	1.5%	3.1%	4.6%	5.9%
S&P 500 Index(3)	6.1%	-0.2%	2.7%	16.1%	14.4%	7.5%	9.2%

(1) Since inception on February 13, 1992.
(2) The Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index is an unmanaged index considered representative of the U.S. investment grade, fixed-rate bond market.
(3) The S&P 500 is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 common stocks. The index is designed to measure performance of the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 500 stocks representing all major industries.

Current performance may be lower or higher than the quoted past performance, which cannot guarantee future results. In addition, NAV performance will vary from market price performance, and you may have a taxable gain or loss when you sell your shares.

Credit markets (including preferreds) had their share of fits and starts in 2015. Monetary policy "liftoff" was a constant debate that kept bond and stock markets on-edge. The Federal Reserve finally did raise short-term rates in December, but it was anticlimactic at best. Sharp declines in commodity prices brought many industries under the microscope, notably energy and metals, as credit metrics began to slip late in the year. Low interest rates, along with a host of mergers and acquisitions, led to a blockbuster year of issuance in corporate-debt securities—in many cases causing leverage ratios to tick higher. These factors led to a widening of credit spreads and sub-par performance in the broader corporate debt market.

[1] Following the methodology required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, total return assumes dividend reinvestment and includes income and principal change, plus the impact of the Fund's leverage and expenses.
[2] September 1 - November 30, 2015

One sector that shined in 2015 was financials. Banks, in particular, bucked the trend of weakening credit metrics. Regulation requiring banks to hold more capital and increased liquidity continued to weigh on earnings. However, having increasing amounts of common equity on the balance sheet is credit enhancing for preferred-securities investors. This credit trend helped bank preferreds perform well during the year, and we believe these regulatory trends are unlikely to reverse anytime soon.

The Fund's energy portfolio, while not large at approximately 5% at year-end, had an outsized negative impact on returns this year. These portfolio holdings are exclusively in pipeline companies—most with very limited direct exposure to oil prices. These companies do, however, have a substantial backlog of projects that will require funding in coming years. Given a sharp drop in equity valuations, companies will increasingly need to rely on debt markets to fund projects. The result has been a dramatic repricing of bonds issued by these companies, as investors demand additional yield for new debt issuance. Preferred securities have weakened in step with debt securities, even though earnings and cash flows should remain relatively healthy. The market has not differentiated much, however, and prices on anything related to energy have moved materially lower.

We have written many times about growth in fixed-to-float preferred securities, noting both benefits (lower duration) and risks (extension)[3]. Performance of these securities was mixed throughout the year, with concerns about back-end-reset spreads on some fixed-to-float securities nearing their first-float dates leading to markedly lower prices. Recall that a back-end spread represents an issuer's credit spread at the end of the fixed-rate period. Simply put, if an issuer's credit spread at time of reset is higher than the reset spread, the security will remain outstanding (extend) and trade at a discount to par value.

Much of the fixed-to-float market was issued in a higher interest-rate environment when credit spreads were tighter. From an issuer's perspective, some outstanding fixed-to-float securities are a cheaper source of capital than could be issued today. Persistently low interest rates, along with a widening of credit spreads, have increased the likelihood of extension for many of these securities—causing them to be a drag on performance throughout the year.

As we have mentioned before, it's not all bad news for fixed-to-float securities. A security with very low duration due to a coupon that will adjust higher as short-term rates increase may be just what many investors want over time. There are also fixed-to-float securities with more current (higher) back-end-reset spreads—which have been among the market's top performers.

One of the best places to be invested in 2015 was in preferreds that are listed on an exchange, typically in $25-par denominations (many of which have fixed-rate coupons). This market segment is the sole focus of preferred ETFs, which have had a disproportionate market impact for many years. ETFs have increased considerably in size as investors have piled on for perceived easy access to preferred securities, and this demand caused prices to move materially higher. Many listed preferred securities have some unflattering characteristics, but ETFs have been large and indiscriminate buyers. Consequently, 2015 returns were excellent, although we view their longer-term prospects less favorably at current prices.

[3] All things being equal, lower-duration securities will not fall in price as much as higher-duration securities would when interest rates rise.

Dividends paid to Fund shareholders have been a bright spot for many years, and 2015 was no exception. Portfolio yields have held up better than expected in this low-rate environment, and leverage costs have remained extremely low. As a result, the Fund's dividend rate has been among the highest offered by closed-end preferred funds. Leverage costs are likely to move higher over 2016, although pace is uncertain. Dividend rates have been set with this in mind and include a bit of cushion against higher short-term rates, but sustained Fed tightening would pressure the Fund's distributable income. We encourage you to read the discussion topic that follows on monthly distributions to shareholders.

Markets are entering a new phase with "liftoff" having occurred in December, but many positive factors supporting the preferred market will persist over the near-term. The path to higher short-term rates is likely to be gradual as the economy shows no signs of overheating and monetary policy around the globe remains exceptionally easy. Approximately 90% of the preferred market is comprised of issuers from "financial" industries, including banks, insurance, finance, and REITs. While not a homogeneous group, broadly speaking we believe these sectors have stronger credit metrics than many other non-financial sectors. A search for yield continues, and preferred securities offer higher yields than most other fixed-income securities—especially for investors able to take advantage of lower tax rates on qualified dividend income.

We close this letter by acknowledging the retirement of a long-time portfolio manager of the Fund, and a co-founder of Flaherty & Crumrine, Don Crumrine. Don retired as a portfolio manager and from Flaherty & Crumrine on December 31, 2015. Don's contributions to the Fund and our firm are immeasurable, but most importantly, he has been instrumental in shaping the culture of the firm so that it can continue to deliver strong investment performance for many years to come. We thank Don for his 33 years of service and lasting contributions, and we wish him all the best in retirement.

In the discussion topics that follow, we dig deeper into subjects mentioned here as well as others of interest to shareholders. In addition, we encourage you to visit the Fund's website, www.preferredincome.com for timely and important information.

The Flaherty & Crumrine Portfolio Management Team

January 1, 2016

DISCUSSION TOPICS
(Unaudited)

The Fund's Portfolio Results and Components of Total Return on NAV

The table below presents a breakdown of the components that comprise the Fund's total return on NAV over both the recent six months and over the Fund's fiscal year. These components include: (a) the total return on the Fund's portfolio of securities; (b) any returns from hedging the portfolio against significant increases in long-term interest rates; (c) the impact of utilizing leverage to enhance returns to shareholders; and (d) the Fund's operating expenses. When all of these components are added together, they comprise the total return on NAV.

Components of PFO's Total Return on NAV
for Periods Ended November 30, 2015

	Six Months[1]	One Year
Total Return on Unleveraged Securities Portfolio (including principal change and income)	1.4%	4.2%
Return from Interest Rate Hedging Strategy	N/A	N/A
Impact of Leverage (including leverage expense)	0.6%	1.5%
Expenses (excluding leverage expense)	-0.7%	-1.3%
Total Return on NAV	**1.3%**	**4.4%**

[1]Actual, not annualized

For the six month and one year periods ended November 30, 2015 the BofA Merrill Lynch 8% Constrained Core West Preferred & Jr Subordinated Securities Index℠ (P8JC)[1] returned 2.3% and 5.7%, respectively. This index reflects the various segments of the preferred securities market constituting the Fund's primary focus. Since this index return excludes all expenses and the impact of leverage, it compares most directly to the top line in the Fund's performance table above (Total Return on Unleveraged Securities Portfolio).

Total Return on Market Price of Fund Shares

While our focus is primarily on managing the Fund's investment portfolio, our shareholders' actual return is comprised of the Fund's monthly dividend payments *plus* changes in the *market price* of Fund shares. During the twelve-month period ending November 30, 2015, total return on market price of Fund shares was -0.1%.

Historically, the preferred securities market has experienced price volatility consistent with those of other fixed-income securities. However, since mid-2007 it has become clear that preferred-security valuations, including both the Fund's NAV and the market price of its shares, can move dramatically when there is volatility in financial markets. The chart on page 5 contrasts the relative stability of the Fund's earlier period with the more recent volatility in both its NAV and market price. Many fixed-income asset classes experienced increased volatility over this period.

[1] The BofA Merrill Lynch 8% Constrained Core West Preferred & Jr Subordinated Securities Index℠ (P8JC) includes U.S. dollar-denominated investment-grade or below investment-grade, fixed rate, floating rate or fixed-to-floating rate, retail or institutionally structured preferred securities of U.S. and foreign issuers with issuer concentration capped at 8%. All index returns include interest and dividend income, and, unlike the Fund's returns, are unmanaged and do not reflect any expenses.



In a more perfect world, the market price of Fund shares and its NAV, as shown in the above chart, would track closely. If so, any premium or discount, calculated as the difference between these two inputs and expressed as a percentage, would remain relatively close to zero. However, as can be seen in the chart below, this often has not been the case.

Although divergence between NAV and market price of a closed-end fund is generally driven by supply/demand imbalances affecting its market price, we can only speculate about why the relationship between the Fund's market price and NAV hasn't been closer.



Based on a closing price of $10.67 on December 31st and assuming its current monthly distribution of $0.073 does not change, the current annualized yield on market price of Fund shares is 8.2%. In our opinion, this distribution rate measures up favorably with most comparable fixed-income investment opportunities. Of course, there can be no guarantee that the Fund's dividend will not change based on market conditions.

Economic and Interest Rate Recap and Outlook

U.S. inflation-adjusted Gross Domestic Product (real GDP) probably grew about 2.2% in 2015, slower than its 2.5% pace in 2014 and below most forecasts (including ours) entering the year. Most of the "miss" in 2015 came in the first quarter, when cold and snow across much of the nation held growth to just 0.6%; it appears to have averaged about 2.7% thereafter, about in-line with earlier full-year forecasts. Private domestic final sales expanded by more than 3%, led by solid gains in personal consumption and residential investment. Business investment and government spending were a little weaker than expected, but a wider trade deficit was 2015's biggest economic headwind. Although U.S. economic growth was only modest in 2015, it was better than that of most other developed nations, and the U.S. dollar rose sharply, curbing exports.

We expect slightly firmer real GDP growth of about 2.5% in 2016. Personal consumption and residential investment should remain strong in 2016 as rising employment and gradually-accelerating wages boost income. In turn, that should prompt higher business investment as the year progresses. Trade probably will remain a headwind, however, and government spending gains are likely to lag as well.

Inflation remained at or below 0.5% in 2015 due to sharply lower energy prices. Recent warm winter weather in the U.S., higher oil output from the Middle East, and rising energy efficiency may push energy prices still lower over the near term, although a sharp drop in exploration activity should put a floor under prices at some point. Core U.S. inflation (i.e., excluding food and energy) edged upward in 2015 and now ranges between 1.2% (core personal consumption expenditure deflator) and 2.0% (core consumer price index).

As a disinflationary impulse from lower energy prices wanes, overall inflation should move up toward core inflation. And because energy prices dropped especially sharply in late 2014 and early 2015, headline inflation could rise fairly quickly in 2016 as those negative months roll out of year-over-year inflation calculations. We're not inflation hawks, but we do expect inflation to pick up in 2016.

With economic growth modest and inflation low in 2015, long-term interest rates finished the year about where they began. Ten- and 30-year Treasury rates rose by 10 basis points (bp) to 2.27% and 26 bp to 3.01%, respectively. Short-term rates spent almost the whole year hovering near zero, finally rising by 25 bp in December when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) ended seven years of zero-interest-rate policy.

We expect the FOMC to hike the fed funds rate by 25 bp per quarter until it reaches 2% or so, with more gradual moves thereafter, bringing rates back to 3-3.5%. We consider this the most likely path of rates, but risks are skewed toward less Fed tightening. Global economic growth is still slow, inflation is muted and most major central banks are easing monetary policy. Too-rapid Fed tightening could cause the U.S. dollar to soar, damaging exports and blunting inflation. Accordingly, markets discount somewhat less tightening than this "most likely" path of rates. We look for long-term Treasury rates to move modestly higher in 2016, but we do not expect another episode like 2013's "taper tantrum," when long-term interest rates shot up by more than 100 bp in short order.

Credit conditions were mixed in 2015. On a positive note, U.S. financial companies (especially banks) continued to build capital and liquidity, and loan defaults and delinquencies fell further. European banks, while not as far along in their recoveries as their U.S. counterparts, are also gradually rebuilding their balance sheets and looking more attractive. In contrast, nonfinancial companies increased leverage in 2015, and their credit metrics began to deteriorate, albeit from very strong levels in most cases. Looking ahead, we think economic and credit conditions should benefit preferred securities again in 2016. Although long-term U.S. interest rates are likely to rise modestly, spreads on preferred securities are wide and should absorb at least a portion of any rate increase. Financial issuers, which make up most of the preferred securities market, should benefit from gradual Fed tightening and improving credit profiles. We believe prospective returns on preferred securities remain attractive for long-term investors (that is, those within an investment horizon of at least 3-5 years) .

Implications of Fed Tightening on Dividends and Investments

In December, the FOMC raised its target for the federal funds rate by 25 bp to 0.25-0.50% after seven years of near-zero interest rates. FOMC members project additional rate hikes over coming years: 100 bp in 2016, 100 bp in 2017 and another 100 bp or so thereafter, bringing the fed funds rate to about 3.5% over a long horizon. Markets currently price in less tightening: 75 bp in 2016, 50 bp in 2017 and a long-run rate of about 3%. Markets expect a slower-and-lower period of tightening than does the Fed. Our own forecasts are in-between.

What will higher short-term rates mean for the Fund? Most directly, cost of the Fund's floating-rate leverage will increase, while income on most of the Fund's investments will hold about steady. Thus, higher leverage cost will reduce distributable income over the short run. That does not necessarily mean that *the Fund's dividend* will fall immediately. We have anticipated rate hikes for some time and set the current dividend rate in light of that. However, higher leverage cost reduces income and will eventually lead to reduced Fund dividends unless it is offset by higher portfolio income. Higher rates could boost portfolio income over time as proceeds of called securities are reinvested (and some securities switch from fixed- to floating-rate), but it may take some time to adjust, and some coupons could float down rather than up. Distributable income is likely to fall over the next couple of years if rates rise as expected.

More positively, higher short-term rates should be associated with a stronger economy, which, in turn, should improve credit performance and lead to narrower yield spreads. This should be particularly true for financial institutions. Nearly all banks are "asset sensitive," meaning their assets re-price more quickly than their liabilities. Banks' net interest margins should expand as rates increase, improving profitability and allowing banks to build capital and reserves more quickly. Yield spreads on preferred securities are wide by historical standards and have ample room to contract, at least partly offsetting higher benchmark interest rates.

We have long said that a distribution yield of roughly 8% in a world of near-zero interest rates was bound to come to an end eventually. It has lasted longer than we and most other market participants expected. While that halcyon period may be coming to a close, we believe preferred securities still offer an attractive combination of high yield, good credit quality and tax-advantaged income.

Monthly Distributions to Fund Shareholders

When it comes to projecting income available to shareholders in future years, the elephant in the room is the expected cost of leverage. Use of leverage is an important part of the Fund's strategy for producing high current income, and we could not produce the Fund's current level of income without it. Leverage costs,

which for the Fund are currently 3-month LIBOR + 0.75%, reset quarterly, remained low throughout 2015. We are, however, another year into economic recovery in the United States and the Fed raised short-term rates in December for the first time in seven years.

Looking into 2016 and beyond, with potentially higher leverage costs, there are two questions that shareholders might ask.

If you expect the cost of leverage to increase, why not remove (or at least reduce) leverage from the fund?

The answer is twofold. First, as shown for this past fiscal year in the first discussion topic above, so long as the cost of leverage is below income earned on the portfolio – which has almost always been the case – income available to shareholders will be higher with leverage than it would be without leverage. Second, following the same logic, removing or substantially reducing leverage today would result in a material reduction in the current dividend rate, given current wide spreads between yields on preferred securities and cost of leverage. So even if leverage costs increase, benefits to distributable income over time can still be substantial as long as leverage costs do not exceed portfolio yield.

If you think short-term rates are going to increase, why don't you hedge the cost of leverage?

In general, hedging is done for two reasons: first, to reduce absolute exposure to a particular risk; and second, to reduce volatility associated with a particular risk. When considering a hedge against a rise in short-term rates, one has to weigh cost versus benefit. If we knew exactly when rates would rise and by how much, then we could evaluate the explicit costs and determine if it would be a winning trade.

Since we don't know the exact timing or magnitude of higher short-term interest rates, a hedge is really another investment decision – one in which we would be betting that the cost of a hedge now (in the form of higher leverage costs today) will be lower than the actual cost of leverage (unhedged) over the hedge's timeframe. In other words, the Fund's distributable income would be lower today if we were to hedge the cost of leverage very far into the future. This is because today's upward-sloping yield curve means the market already expects rates in the future to be higher, so that expected cost is reflected in hedging cost today.

We acknowledge this is complicated, but to simplify: hedging the cost of leverage today would result in lower income today – and may or may not result in improved return (relative to no hedge) in the future. This is because hedging today costs money.

We are not opposed to hedging leverage costs in the right context. However, we acknowledge that a hedge is a bet on the timing and magnitude of rate increases relative to the market's pricing of these risks. There are times when the market's expectations of future rates make this a worthwhile bet, or when risk reduction offered by hedging is particularly valuable, but we don't feel this is true today. Funds that hedged over the past couple years missed out on quite a bit of distributable income without providing protection until very recently, since short-term interest rates didn't move higher until December 2015.

We would like our shareholders to understand that we are not currently hedging the cost of leverage, and are unlikely to do so unless the market's expectations (and, therefore, hedging costs) change. As a result, shareholders are receiving more income today (and have received more over the last several years) in exchange for potentially lower income and returns in the future. Given the current cost of hedging, we have so far decided it is best to take short-term rates as they come.

Federal Tax Advantages of 2015 Calendar Year Distributions

In calendar year 2015, approximately 72.4% of distributions made by the Fund was eligible for treatment as qualified dividend income, or QDI. For taxpayers in the 15% marginal tax bracket, QDI is taxed by the federal government at 0% instead of an individual's ordinary income tax rate; for taxpayers in the 25%-35% marginal tax brackets, QDI is taxed at 15%; and for taxpayers in the 39.6% marginal tax bracket, QDI is taxed at 20%.

For an individual in the 28% marginal tax bracket, this means that the Fund's total distributions will only be taxed at a blended 18.6% rate versus the 28% rate which would apply to distributions by a fund investing in traditional corporate bonds. This tax advantage means that, all other things being equal, such an individual who held 100 shares of Common Stock of the Fund for the calendar year would have had to receive approximately $99.05 in distributions from a fully-taxable bond fund to net the same after-tax amount as the $87.60 in distributions paid by the Fund.

For detailed information about tax treatment of particular distributions received from the Fund, please see the Form 1099 you receive from either the Fund or your broker.

Corporate shareholders also receive a federal tax benefit from the 38.5% distributions that were eligible for the inter-corporate dividends received deduction, or DRD.

It is important to remember that composition of the portfolio and income distributions can change from one year to the next, and that the QDI or DRD portions of 2016's distributions may not be the same (or even similar) to 2015.

Contingent Capital Securities

Some debt and traditional and hybrid preferred securities include “loss absorption” provisions that make the securities more like equity. These securities are generally referred to as contingent capital securities, or “CoCos.” CoCos are typically issued by financial companies, such as banks, in order to be a source of capital in a time of crisis.

In one type of a CoCo, the security has loss absorption characteristics whereby the liquidation value of the security may be written down to below original principal amount (even to zero) under certain circumstances. This may occur, for instance, in the event that business losses have eroded capital to a substantial extent. Such securities may, but are not required to, provide for circumstances under which liquidation value may be adjusted back up, such as an improvement in capitalization and/or earnings.

Another type of a CoCo provides for mandatory conversion of the security into common shares of the issuer under certain circumstances. A mandatory conversion might result, for instance, from the issuer’s failure to maintain a capital minimum. In addition, some Cocos provide for an automatic write-down if the price of the common stock is below the conversion price on the conversion date.

An automatic write-down or conversion event is typically triggered by a reduction in the capital level of the issuer, but may also be triggered by regulatory actions (e.g., a change in capital requirements) or by other factors.

Risks of Investing in Contingent Capital Securities

CoCo’s which are subject to an automatic write-down (i.e., automatic write-down of the original principal amount, potentially to zero, and cancellation of the securities) under certain circumstances could result in the Fund losing a portion or all of its investment in such securities. In addition, the Fund may not have any rights with respect to repayment of the principal amount of the securities that have not become due or the payment of interest or dividends on such securities for any period from (and including) the interest or dividend payment date falling immediately prior to the occurrence of such automatic write-down. An automatic write-down could also result in a reduced income rate if the dividend or interest payment is based on the security’s written-down value. Finally, since the write-down would occur automatically, holders would not be able to protect the value of the security through the bankruptcy process.

If a CoCo provides for mandatory conversion of the security into common shares of the issuer under certain circumstances and such conversion event occurs, the Fund could experience a reduced income rate, potentially to zero, as a result of the issuer’s common shares not paying a dividend. In addition, a conversion event would likely be the result of or related to the deterioration of the issuer’s financial condition (e.g., a decrease in the issuer’s regulatory capital ratio) and status as a going concern, so the market price of the issuer’s common shares received by the Fund will have likely declined, perhaps substantially, and may continue to decline, which may adversely affect the Fund’s NAV. Further, the issuer’s common shares would be subordinate to the issuer’s other security classes and therefore worsen the Fund’s standing in a bankruptcy proceeding.

It will often be difficult to predict when, if at all, an automatic write-down or conversion event will occur. Accordingly, trading behavior of CoCos may not follow trading behavior of other types of debt and preferred securities. Any indication that an automatic write-down or conversion event may occur can be expected to have a material adverse effect on the market price of a CoCo. CoCos are a relatively new form of security and the full effects of an automatic write-down or conversion event have not been experienced broadly in the marketplace. An automatic write-down or conversion event may be unpredictable and the potential effects of such event on the Fund's yield, NAV and/or market price would likely be adverse, perhaps materially so. As of November 30, 2015, less than 2% of the Fund's assets were invested in CoCos. The Fund is not limited in the extent to which it can invest in CoCos.