

FLAHERTY & CRUMRINE PREFERRED INCOME OPPORTUNITY FUND

To the Shareholders of the Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Opportunity Fund (“PFO”):

Beginning with issues arising in the subprime mortgage loan market, a well-publicized series of events has roiled financial markets over the past several months. The preferred stock market and closed-end funds have been particularly impacted, and, consequently, for the Fund’s third fiscal quarter ended August 31, 2007, the Fund had a total return of -5.5% on the net asset value (NAV) of its Common Stock.

As we’ve discussed in prior letters, problems in the subprime mortgage loan market first bubbled up in January of this year. Throughout this year, the Fund has had no direct exposure to subprime loans, and we avoided investing in companies that had meaningful risks associated with the product. Our research team closely monitors the loan quality and underwriting standards of each financial company in the portfolio, and we invest only in companies that meet our quality thresholds. We’re not perfect, but we believe that the Fund’s portfolio is comprised of holdings in fundamentally sound companies.

In isolation, the impact of this weakness in the subprime loan market should have been limited to direct participants in this market; unfortunately, given the complexity of the financial system, few things happen in isolation. When the subprime problems became more pronounced several months ago, the fallout from this subprime weakness has been widespread and severe.

Fueled by low interest rates and relatively relaxed financing terms, a great deal more leverage had become built into the system than even just a few years ago. As investments directly associated with subprime mortgages declined significantly in value during the quarter, they became very illiquid. Highly-leveraged investors then were forced to sell other more liquid types of assets like investment-grade preferred and debt securities to meet redemptions or margin calls. Risk and liquidity premiums surged, indiscriminately taking yields on all credit instruments with them. In short, excess leverage created the financial powder keg and subprime loan problems provided the spark.

With yields on preferred securities rising more than yields on more senior debt securities, the prices of the securities in our portfolio fell as the supply of preferred securities exceeded demand. The rearview mirror is still a bit foggy, but it appears that much of the selling pressure came from hedge funds. Hedge funds had become the 800-pound gorilla in the credit markets recently, and although they’ve been forced to slim down, they can still have a big impact.

Hedge funds were not the only investors selling, but since they aren’t required to disclose their preferred securities holdings, no one knows how extensive their selling pressure was. As a result, prospective buyers were extremely cautious because they feared additional selling would further depress prices. Wall Street brokers and dealers normally stand ready to provide liquidity to sellers, but they appeared reluctant to buy. Long-term investors like the Fund, as well as individual investors, insurance companies and pension funds, also stayed on the sidelines for the most part. During the quarter, and since it ended, we have added some positions at attractive levels, but we are continuing to take a go-slow approach.

Subprime fallout also extended to the market for short-term, or money-market, securities such as commercial paper and auction-rate securities. This market was in a state of disarray throughout August and into early September. Investors in money-market securities don’t like risk, and, at the slightest hint of trouble, they pull their money out and invest in short-term government securities. While the perception of risk is real for a small segment of borrowers, the reaction seems to be disproportionate.

These disruptions in the short-term market impacted the Fund in two meaningful ways. First, they contributed to price weakness in many of the Fund’s investments, particularly in financial companies.

While banks can fulfill their short-term financing needs with customer deposits and through the Federal Reserve, finance companies like broker-dealers need to rely on the short-term securities market to run their day-to-day operations. This market is like oxygen to most financial companies, and restricting their borrowing makes it more expensive for them to operate. We continue to believe that none of the financial companies in our portfolio face significant risks of default as a result of this increased cost of borrowing, but it has clearly impacted their earnings outlooks and the prices of their preferred securities.


Second, the rates paid by the Fund on its own auction-rate Preferred Stock have risen significantly as a direct result of liquidity problems in the financial markets. The frustrating irony is that the Fund's own Preferred Stock is of very high quality with a rating of AA and logic would dictate that rates should fall as investors seek out higher quality investments. This high quality is a function of the Investment Company Act (which governs the Fund) and the guidelines imposed by the rating agencies. As Kevin Conery, Merrill Lynch's Preferred Stock Strategist, recently observed about the Investment Company Act, "while some have criticized it for being too conservative for its 200% asset coverage test, at times like these in the market, we respect this discipline." While we are beginning to see some improvement in the auction rates of our Preferred Stock, and the recent interest rate cut by the Federal Reserve should help over the coming months, we haven't yet returned to more normalized auction rates.

The higher cost of our auction-rate Preferred Stock comes directly out of money available for distribution as the monthly Common Stock dividend. On the plus side, higher yields on preferred stock mean that we have been able to increase the income earned on the portfolio. It will take some time to see how these two offsetting factors affect income; in the meantime we are doing our best to manage both. Effective with the August dividend, we raised the dividend by 5% and we continue to be comfortable with that increased dividend payment; nonetheless, we strive to pay out a rate that is sustainable and will make adjustments as conditions warrant.


We have been through periods of fear and volatility before, and we remain optimistic about long-term prospects for the Fund. Such periods create opportunities to buy securities of sound companies at discounted prices, as many shorter-term investors exit the market by selling both good and bad investments. We expect both more rational pricing and reduced risk of early redemption of our portfolio securities as markets settle down – both of which should benefit future returns for long-term investors. In addition, our Preferred Stock auction rates are likely to normalize in due course, as the market begins to better recognize the credit quality of our Preferred Stock. While we cannot say with certainty when, or if, these things will happen, as managers we are doing our best to position the Fund to ride out the current storm and prepare for better days ahead.

In volatile market conditions like these, we may provide more frequent updates about the preferred securities market and the Fund's portfolio. We did so this past quarter by adding special Questions and Answers regarding the market price of the Fund's shares to the Fund's website at www.preferredincome.com. We encourage you to stay informed as shareholders by periodically visiting the website for additional information about your Fund.

Sincerely,



Donald F. Crumrine
Chairman of the Board



Robert M. Ettinger
President

October 17, 2007